The New Hotness in Phishing: Device Code Attacks in M365
TrustedSec describes device code phishing attacks exploiting the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant (RFC 8628) to compromise M365 accounts with unusual effectiveness. The attacker initiates the device code flow targeting a trusted first-party client ID (e.g., Microsoft Office), persuades the victim to visit the authentic microsoft.com/devicelogin and enter the code, then captures OAuth tokens when the victim completes legitimate sign-in. The attack bypasses Conditional Access policies because authentication originates from Microsoft’s infrastructure and generates legitimate MFA prompts; the victim sees nothing suspicious, leaving only an OAuth token in attacker-controlled logs. The technique has surfaced repeatedly across BEC and M365 incident response engagements and is automated by tools like TokenTacticsV2 and roadtx, enabling broad-scale exploitation.