Race Against The Patch: The Evolution of Four Exploit Chains in LiteLLM
STAR Labs researchers developed four full exploit chains against LiteLLM (versions 1.82.3–1.83.14) for Pwn2Own Berlin 2026, each achieving RCE from an authenticated internal user key. The chains include: (1) auth bypass via Prisma DB connection-pool exhaustion combined with an allow_requests_on_db_unavailable misconfiguration that silently grants proxy admin identity on any DB error; (2) multiple follow-on privilege escalation and code execution primitives that evolved across four versions as the vendor patched. The core pre-auth bypass exploits a broad except Exception handler in user_api_key_auth.py that routes all failures — including attacker-induced DB pool exhaustion (default 10 connections, no rate limiting) — to an unauthenticated admin fallback. Each subsequent version required entirely new vulnerability combinations, illustrating iterative patch bypass across a rapidly evolving AI gateway product with high-value credential access.