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From context_handle to type confusion

A type confusion vulnerability pattern affecting Windows RPC servers arises from insufficient constraints in IDL definitions and lack of validation of context-handle types. The author discovered that RPC context handles marked as FC_BINDING_CONTEXT (0x70) bypass validation during unmarshalling, unlike FC_SUPPLEMENT types (0x75), allowing an attacker to pass one context-handle type into an interface expecting another. In ssdpsrv, passing a CONTEXT_HANDLE into a SYNC_HANDLE interface enables arbitrary handle closure via reference-count manipulation (CVE-2025-48815). The same pattern was identified in message queuing (MQQM, CVE-2025-53143) and firewall (fwbase, CVE-2025-54104) RPC servers, demonstrating a systemic vulnerability class across Windows infrastructure components. The research includes reverse-engineering of rpcrt4.dll and practical exploitation techniques using James Forshaw’s NtObjectManager to identify vulnerable RPC servers.

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