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After Binance, check what your signing systems can approve

Trail of Bits analyzes the Binance October 2026 incident, where a compromised DevOps laptop and misused internal AI tool gave attackers access to the wallet-signing service, not the private key itself. The attacker obtained valid signatures to deploy an EIP-7702 delegation—a standing instruction allowing arbitrary code execution on the wallet—enabling repeated fund transfers without additional signatures. The article exposes a critical operational risk: signing services must monitor not just asset transfers but also authority changes (delegations, modules, ERC-4337 operations) that can persist across chains and enable future theft. Four concrete defensive controls are provided: restrict signing API access, treat delegations as administrative privileges requiring separate approval, enforce independent custody limits on the operational key, and detect all forms of wallet authority changes including EIP-7702 and ERC-4337 paths.

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